The recent G20 meeting that took place in Delhi over the past few days has demonstrated the country’s constant desire to stay away from the Ukraine conflict, not taking a position on the side of Western countries or Russia. A choice rooted in a long tradition of impartiality which is increasingly manifested in the form of diplomatic balancing acts. We saw it in the United Nations Security Council where India is a non-permanent member until the end of 2022. And India has always abstained from resolutions condemning Russian intervention. And recently at the end of February, at the UN General Assembly, India also abstained. And in general, in its official position, India prefers to use the term “crisis” rather than the term “war”.

Understanding India’s Dependence on Russia

This relationship is primarily based on defense cooperation rooted in the Cold War. The two countries signed a bilateral friendship treaty in 1971, it was the first friendship treaty the Soviet Union signed with a non-socialist country. There is a guarantee of passive security in the agreement. The defense relationship between India and Russia really developed during the Cold War, accelerated by the fact that the United States had a policy of embargo against India and Pakistan after the wars of 1965 and 1971, and after India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. This defense cooperation is characterized mainly by India’s dependence on Russian weaponry. As of 2020, 70-85% of India’s primary weapons systems will still be of Russian origin. Russia has long been open to the transfer of advanced equipment and advanced technology at lower prices than the West. We saw this recently with the joint development of the BrahMos supersonic missile, and India’s first nuclear submarine, and India’s purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft system. But India is now trying to diversify its arms sources, but that will take a long time.

“Energy is also an important aspect of the Russian-Indian cooperation. India had been importing Russian gas before the start of the war in Ukraine, but since February 24, 2022, India has massively increased its oil imports. Before the Russian invasion, 2% of Russian exports went to India; today represents 22%. Significant increase. The argument made by Indian diplomacy is that the country grew 6% and cannot afford lower oil prices.”

Western sanctions do not weigh on this trade. India has now managed to circumvent these sanctions with the rupee/ruble payment mechanism. Recently, Russia asked India to set up a Russian bank on Indian territory which could help expedite this transaction.

Multilateralism serves strategic autonomy?

India has always benefited from a certain tolerance towards Western countries, through a regime of exclusion and circumvention of sanctions. This was in the 2000s when India was importing Iranian gas while we were in the midst of negotiations within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. India also benefits from an exclusion regime in the nuclear supply group, as it is not a signatory to non-proliferation treaties, but can trade civilian nukes with the United States or other countries such as France. India being a key player in the Indo-Pacific zone issue, the majority of Western countries want to cooperate with Delhi and regard India as one of the main partners, especially in the balancing efforts made to stem the rise of China. . From India’s point of view, China is the main rival. The situation on the Sino-Indian border remains extremely tense, especially since the incident in Ladakh in north-east India in 2020. Border talks have been ongoing since 2020, but both armies remain vigilant along the border.

India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which includes China, Russia and Iran. And at the same time, the country is engaged in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which in the Indo-Pacific brings together the United States, Japan and Australia. For India, these two files are very different and not mutually exclusive. SCO is a multilateral organization, focused on the idea of ​​greater connectivity in Central Asia. The challenge for India, which joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017, is to strengthen this cooperation and increase its interests in the Central Asian republics, while trying to balance China, which wields enormous influence within this same group. For the Quad, India turns to the Indo-Pacific and with particular challenges, particularly maritime security, to counterbalance here again China’s rise in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. India is deeply concerned about its neighbor’s increasing dependence on China. However, India wished that the Quad would not become a military security alliance.

“Indian multi-alignment is a foreign policy doctrine of the country and a modernized legacy of non-aligned nations. This idea was recently theorized by Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar who published Indian way in 2021 and which made it clear that India should be able to derive all the benefits from the contradictions of the international system by promoting its interests with its various partners.”

Mélissa Levaillant participated in the direction of the book Peace and Security, an off-center anthologywith Sonia le Gouriellec and Delphine Allès, published on 09 February by the CNRS edition.

overture: Kiran Ahluwalia

Khafa (Take Arms)